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Abstract: Considerable recent work has reached mixed conclusions about 
whether and how globalization affects the inflation–output trade-off and 
suggests that the ultimate effect of openness on the output–inflation 
relationship is influenced by a variety of factors. In this paper, we consider 
the impact of exchange-rate pass through and examine how pass through 
conditions the effect of openness on the sacrifice ratio. We develop a simple 
theoretical model showing how the extent of both pass through and openness 
can interact to influence the output–inflation relationship. Next we empirically 
explore the nature of these two variables and their interaction. Results 
indicate that greater pass through increases the sacrifice ratio, that there is 
statistically significant interaction between pass through and openness, and—
once the extent of pass through is taken into account alongside other factors 
that affect the sacrifice ratio, such as central bank independence—openness 
fails to exert an empirically robust effect on the sacrifice ratio. 
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1. Introduction 
Does globalization affect inflation? Romer (1993) found a 
negative cross-country relationship between inflation and the degree 
of openness to international trade. This sparked a number of 
theoretical and empirical studies on how openness affects the inflation-
output tradeoff and how this relationship is conditioned upon possible 
interactions of openness and other key aspects of the aggregate 
economy. Romer suggests that greater openness to trade enhances 
negative terms-of-trade effects resulting from domestic output 
expansions, thereby reducing the incentive for a central bank to 
engage in inflationary policymaking, and Lane (1997) proposes that 
greater trade openness reduces the potential output gains from 
unexpected inflation in non-traded-goods sectors characterized by 
imperfect competition and sticky product prices. Furthermore, Karras 
(1999) argues that greater indexation of nominal wages to unexpected 
inflation in response to increased trade openness could also reduce the 
incentive for central banks to inflate. 
The explanations provided by Romer, Lane, and Karras imply 
that the effects of openness on the inflation realizations operate by 
worsening the terms of the output–inflation trade-off faced by central 
banks. Temple (2002), however, has suggested that there is little 
cross-country evidence that increased trade openness reduces the 
sacrifice ratio. Daniels et al. (2005) propose that once the inflation-
reducing impact of greater central bank independence is taken into 
account, there is evidence in cross-country data that increased trade 
openness actually increases the sacrifice ratio, a result inconsistent 
with Rogoff's (2006) suggestion that increased globalization tends to 
make the Phillips curve steeper. This result, Daniels and VanHoose 
(2006) argue, is consistent with a view that greater trade openness 
exposes imperfectly competitive firms to greater competition, thereby 
reducing their pricing power and effectively increasing the observed 
responsiveness of output to changes in the inflation rate. Badinger 
(2009) has obtained results consistent with this prediction in an 
analysis of data from 91 countries over the 1985–2004 interval. 
Recent work has added other elements that can impinge on the 
relationship between trade openness and the sacrifice ratio: political 
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regime (Caporale and Caporale, 2008), progressivity of income 
taxation (Daniels and VanHoose, 2009a), capital mobility (Daniels and 
VanHoose, 2009b), labor-market structures (Bowdler and Nunziata, 
2010), reliance on imported commodities in production (Pickering and 
Valle, 2012). 
Nevertheless, Daniels and VanHoose also point out that the 
ultimate effects of increased trade openness on the sacrifice ratio 
hinge on a number of structural factors likely to vary across countries. 
Along this same line, Neiss (2001) suggests that the effect of 
openness on inflation becomes more muted—indeed, empirically 
insignificant—once markups are taken into account. In addition, 
Bowdler (2009) finds that the relationship between openness and the 
sacrifice ratio depends on the exchange-rate regime that is in place, 
and Cavelaars (2009) suggests that the nature of this relationship 
likely is influenced by trade costs. Ball (2006) argues that for the 
United States there is in fact no clear evidence that globalization 
impinges on the process by which inflation is determined.2 One 
contribution of this paper is to provide a new motivation for why the 
effects of greater openness on the sacrifice ratio might be theoretically 
ambiguous. Our explanation focuses on an interplay between the 
degree of openness and the extent of exchange-rate pass through 
within a direct price-level effect and an opposing indirect exchange-
rate effect on the sacrifice ratio. In addition, the paper seeks to 
determine the net effects of this interplay by utilizing empirical 
measures of the degree of openness and the extent of pass through. 
A number of recent studies examine the varying degree of 
exchange-rate pass through among economies and changes in pass-
through estimates over time. Taylor (2000), for example, argues that 
changes in individual expectations regarding price-setting behavior has 
led to lower inflation and lower price margins, and, as a consequence, 
reduced pass through. Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) maintain that a 
greater emphasis on inflation stabilization has led to both lower mean 
inflation and a reduced extent of pass through. Based on cross-country 
panel estimates, Campa and Goldberg (2005) examine the main 
theoretical arguments explaining cross-country differences and 
changes over time in exchange-rate pass through. They argue that 
inflation performance, nominal exchange-rate volatility, and other 
macroeconomic factors play an important but limited role in 
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influencing cross-country differences in pass through. Campa and 
Goldberg find that changes in the composition of trade—specifically, a 
shift to a greater share of manufactures in a country's import bundle—
correlates with a lower extent of pass through. Marazzi et al. (2005) 
show that, in addition to the change in the composition of imports, the 
growing importance of Chinese trade may have reduced the extent of 
U.S. pass through. They suggest that markets experiencing the 
greatest reductions in the extent of pass through are those in which 
China has recorded an increased market share. At a macroeconomic 
level, Flamini (2007) and Adolfson (2007) focus on the design of 
optimal monetary policy and show that the effectiveness of monetary 
policy can be conditioned upon the degree of exchange-rate pass 
through. Hence, accounting for the degree of pass through can 
improve monetary policy and thereby reduce mean inflation. 
Our objective here is not to add to the debate on the 
microeconomic or macroeconomic determinants of the extent of 
exchange-rate pass through or regarding the optimal design of 
monetary policy in light of partial pass through. Instead, this paper 
investigates the effect of exchange-rate pass through on the sacrifice 
ratio and the role that the extent of exchange-rate pass through has in 
influencing the relationship between the degree of openness to 
international trade and the output–inflation trade-off. We begin by 
developing a simple theoretical model showing how both the extent of 
pass through and the degree of openness can affect the sacrifice ratio 
and how these two factors can also interact to influence the sacrifice 
ratio. The model illustrates how both factors work through competing 
channels, which renders their overall impacts on the sacrifice ratio 
theoretically ambiguous. The model also predicts that a greater extent 
of pass through either enhances a positive impact or reduces a 
negative effect of greater openness on the sacrifice ratio. Finally, the 
model indicates that the overall impact of greater openness on the 
sacrifice ratio is likely to be indeterminate when considering the 
competing effects of key characteristics of the economy, including in 
particular the extent of exchange-rate pass through. 
Using cross-country data spanning 20 countries for the period 
1975 through 2004, we find that there is in fact evidence that the 
degree of pass through directly influences the sacrifice ratio and 
impinges on the impact of increased openness on the sacrifice ratio. 
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Specifically, a greater extent of pass through contributes to a higher 
sacrifice ratio and reduces the negative effect of greater openness on 
the sacrifice ratio. Additional estimates taking into account the extent 
of central bank independence indicate that the net effect of greater 
openness on the sacrifice ratio is not empirically robust. Lastly, we 
consider the role of wage contracting in the economy as a factor 
conditioning the impact of exchange-rate pass through on the sacrifice 
ratio. We find that the effect of pass through on the sacrifice ratio 
remains positive, is statistically significant, and increases with a 
greater extent of wage contracting as measured by union density. 
The following section provides a theoretical explanation for 
interdependence of the effects of a greater extent of pass through and 
an increased degree of openness on the output–inflation relationship 
as measured by the sacrifice ratio. Section 3 utilizes cross-country 
data on the extent of pass through, the degree of openness, and other 
variables relevant to the determination of sacrifice ratios to evaluate 
the empirical predictions forthcoming from our theoretical model. 
Section 4 summarizes our conclusions. 
2. A model of interdependence among pass 
through, openness, and the sacrifice ratio 
The literature on discretionary policymaking suggests that a 
nation's equilibrium inflation rate depends crucially on two key factors: 
the preferences of its monetary authority in terms of relative weights 
on output versus inflation and the country's output–inflation 
relationship faced by the monetary authority. To examine the effects 
of a greater extent of pass through on a nation's output–inflation 
relationship, we consider an adaptation of the model developed in 
Daniels and VanHoose (2006). 
2.1. Theoretical model 
In the model, there are numerous atomistic sectors, indexed i. 
These sectors are distributed uniformly along a unit interval. Each 
sector contains large numbers of workers and firms, the latter of which 
produce an identical good, which is differentiated from the goods 
produced in other sectors. Following Ball (1988) and Duca and 
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VanHoose (2000), we assume an identical price elasticity of demand 
across sectors for the sake of simplicity and tractability. A portion, Ω, 
of firms have workforces that contractually set nominal wages in 
advance of labor-market clearing. In the remaining fraction, 1 −  Ω, of 
firms, spot labor markets determine nominal wages. 
As a simplification, we restrict the analysis to wage stickiness as 
the only potential source of nominal rigidities in a portion of our model 
economy's sectors, rather than including as well a potential role for 
price stickiness. In reality, of course, as recently documented by Gwin 
and VanHoose (2012), there are real-world sectoral variations in the 
degrees of stickiness of both wages and prices, and in principle we 
could consider a more complicated model allowing for both sources of 
nominal rigidities. As we demonstrate below, however, allowing for 
nominal rigidities arising solely from wage stickiness is sufficient to 
generate several interrelationships among variables and to yield 
contrasting effects of these variables on a nation's sacrifice ratio. 
Including additionally a role for sticky prices undoubtedly would 
introduce additional channels through which openness and pass 
through might affect the sacrifice ratio, but at a substantial cost in 
terms of model complexity. Consequently, we eschew consideration of 
varying degrees of price flexibility across sectors, which might be a 
fruitful avenue of future research. 
In our framework, the output produced by a given firm in sector 
i is 
𝛾𝑖 = 𝛼Ι𝑖 , 
(1) 
where yi is the log of output and li is the log of employment at a firm in 
sector i. The demand for the output of a firm in sector i as a share of 
aggregate domestic output is 
𝛾𝑖 − 𝛾 = −𝜀(𝜌𝑖 − 𝜌), 
(2) 
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where 𝛾 ≡ ∫ 𝛾𝑖d𝑖
1
0
 is the log of aggregate domestic output; 𝜌 ≡ ∫ 𝛾𝜌𝑖d𝑖
1
0
 
is the log of the index of prices charged by domestic firms; and 𝜀 > 1 
is the price elasticity of demand. 
Domestic income is determined by the quantity equation, 
𝛾 = 𝑚 − 𝑝 
(3) 
where m is the log of the money stock and the log of velocity has been 
normalized at a value of zero. The domestic nation's income–
expenditure equilibrium condition (for a derivation, see, for instance, 
Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991; or Bryson et al., 1993) is given by 
𝛾 = 𝜂(𝜌Μ + 𝑠 − 𝜌) + (1 − 𝛽)𝛾 + 𝛽∗𝛾∗ 
(4) 
where η is the elasticity of desired spending with respect to the real 
exchange rate; β and β∗, which are fractions, are home and foreign 
propensities to import; pM is the log of the aggregate level of prices 
charged by foreign producers and invoiced in foreign prices; s is the 
log of the domestic currency price of foreign currency; and y∗ is the log 
of aggregate foreign output. 
2.2. Incorporating micro-foundations of exchange-rate 
pass through 
We incorporate the extent of exchange-rate pass through into 
the model along the lines of Campa and Goldberg (2005). We denote 
by pM an index of prices charged by foreign producers in the import 
market (measured in foreign currency units), which equal a markup, 
mu∗, over the marginal costs of foreign producers, mc∗, such that: 
𝜌Μ = 𝑚𝑢∗(𝛾) + 𝛾𝑚𝑐∗, 
(5) 
where γ is a parameter measuring the extent of pass through 
equal to unity under full pass through versus zero under zero pass 
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through. The markup is assumed to be a function of prices 
(expressed in foreign currency units) charged by competing 
domestic producers, p − s, and an index measure of fixed effects 
across the aggregate economy, ɸ: 
𝑚𝑢 ∗ (𝛾) = 𝜙 + (1 − 𝛾)(𝑝 − 𝑠). 
(6) 
The marginal costs of foreign producers are equal to prices charged by 
foreign producers in the foreign market, p∗. These prices depend on 
wages in the foreign market, w∗, and on demand conditions in the 
foreign market, captured by foreign income, y∗. Marginal costs of 
foreign producers, therefore, are expressed as 
𝑚𝑐 ∗= 𝜑𝑤 ∗ +𝜑𝑦 ∗. 
(7) 
Hence, prices charged by foreign producers in domestic import 
markets are 
pM=ϕ+(1-γ)(p-s)+γ(φw*+φy*) 
(8) 
With the index of fixed effects normalized to unity (so that the log of 
this index, ɸ, equals zero), and using p∗ in equation (7), the index of 
prices charged by foreign producers in the domestic import market can 
be more conveniently expressed as 
𝑝𝑀 = (1 − 𝛾)(𝑝 − 𝑠) +γp*. 
(9) 
This index of prices indicates that under domestic-currency pricing—
that is, zero pass through—γ = 0, and pM = p − s. Under producer-
currency pricing or full pass through, γ = 1, and pM = p∗. With 
incomplete pass through, 0 < γ < 1. Along the lines of Campa and 
Goldberg, this price index allows pass through to depend on underlying 
structural elements such as industry structure and competition. 
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2.3. The determinants of exchange-rate pass through 
As stated earlier, our objective is not to add to the debate on 
the determinants of exchange-rate pass through, and so in our model 
we treat γ as exogenous. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind 
the theoretical determinants of pass through when implementing our 
empirical analysis, which employs the elasticity estimates of Campa 
and Goldberg. 
Beginning with industry characteristics, Dornbush (1987) uses 
an industrial-organization approach to model the potential impact of 
exchange rate changes on import prices. He argues that, given wage 
costs in both the exporting market and in the importing market, the 
degree of price adjustment depends on three different aspects: 
product substitutability between domestic output and foreign output, 
the degree of market integration with the world market, and market 
organization or the degree of competition. The elasticity of domestic 
prices to exchange rate movements increases with greater competition 
among firms in the importing market (relatively homogeneous 
products and a large number of domestic firms such that price taking 
behavior results) and with an increase in the number of foreign firms 
relative to the number of home firms. Recent empirical work by 
Bhattacharya et al. (2008) shows considerable variation in the degree 
of pass through across U.S. industries. 
Numerous authors, including Campa and Goldberg (2005), 
argue that the composition of a nation's import basket may affect the 
degree of exchange-rate pass through. Specifically, the import basket 
of most advanced economies shifted away from a large share of 
energy and a small share of manufactures (less than 50 percent) to a 
smaller share of energy and larger share of manufactures (over 75 
percent). This would influence pass through if there is greater 
competition among exporters in the manufactures sector as compared 
to the energy sector as the shift would heighten the elasticity of import 
demand. Bergin and Feenstra (2009) extend this analysis, showing 
that the change in the U.S. import basket from energy to 
manufactures further led to an increase in imports from China. They 
argue that the shift to imports from China, which pegs the domestic 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol 36 (September 2013): pg. 131-150. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission 
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
10 
 
currency to the U.S. dollar, made U.S. imports less sensitive to 
exchange rate movements. 
At a more macro level, Taylor (2000) argues that changes in the 
inflation environment to lower average inflation reduced the pricing 
power of firms and thereby resulted in lower exchange-rate pass 
through. Devereux and Yetman (2010) extends this approach within a 
sticky-price model, concluding that pass through increases with 
average inflation but at a declining rate. There are a number of 
authors whose empirical results support the hypothesis that the 
inflation environment affects pass through, including Takhtamanova 
(2010), Gagnon and Ihrig (2004), and Shintani et al. (2012). Others 
[Adolfson (2007) and Engel (2008) for example] consider a potential 
feedback in that the degree of pass through affects the transmission of 
exchange rate movements into domestic prices and, therefore, may 
condition monetary policy and the resulting inflation level. 
Recent empirical studies also indicate that other structural 
characteristics may condition pass through. Gust et al. (2010), on the 
one hand, claim that an increase in trade openness raises the 
responsiveness of exporters to competitors' prices and therefore 
reduces pass through. An and Wang (2011), on the other hand, argue 
that a higher import share increases pass through, along with higher 
inflation, monetary policy variability, smaller country size, and 
exchange-rate persistence. 
As noted above, the purpose of this paper is not to weigh in on 
the empirical determinants of exchange-rate pass through. Instead, it 
is to understand if cross-country differences in pass through may 
affect the sacrifice ratio. Nonetheless, the literature described above 
raises possible collinearity and endogeneity issues that should be 
considered in our empirical work in Section 3. 
2.4. Exchange-rate pass through and output 
If we were to specify analogous structural relationships for a 
foreign nation, the result would be a two-country framework in which 
y∗ and p∗ would be treated as fully endogenous variables. In order to 
concentrate on a basic open-economy setting with the potential for 
incomplete pass through, we assume that foreign output and the 
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foreign price index are exogenous and equal to a normalized level of 
unity. Thus, y∗ and p∗ equal zero, and β∗ in equation (4) becomes 
irrelevant to the analysis. 
Using anti-logged versions of equation (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) 
in the profit function, PiYi − WiLi, substituting the normalizations Y∗ = 1 
(y∗ = 0) and P∗ = 1 (p∗ = 0), and working out the first order condition for 
Li yields the log-linear labor demand function for a firm i (with the 
intercept suppressed because it plays no role in our subsequent 
analysis): 
𝑙𝑖
𝑑 =
−𝜀(𝑤𝑖 − 𝑝) + 𝜂𝛾(𝑠 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑚 − 𝑝)
𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀
, 
(10) 
where wi is the log of the nominal wage for the firm. 
Workers can consume both domestically produced output and 
foreign-produced goods. Consequently, labor supply to firms depends 
on the real wage computed in terms of the overall price workers pay 
for a basket of both domestic and foreign goods, where the consumer 
price index is (1 − 𝛽)𝑝 + 𝛽(𝑝𝑀 + 𝑠) and λ > 0 is the labor supply 
elasticity: 
𝑙𝑖
𝑠 = 𝜆[𝑤𝑖 − (1 − 𝛽𝛾)𝑝 − 𝛽𝛾𝑠]. 
(11) 
For firms with or without nominal wage contracts, the full-information, 
market-clearing wage satisfies (10) and (11) simultaneously and 
equals 
?̂?𝑖 =
[𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀)𝛽 + 𝜂]𝛾(𝑠 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑚 − 𝑝)
[𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + 𝜀]
. 
(12) 
Hence, this nominal wage rate, which is the wage actually paid in 
sector i if it is among the share, 1 − Ω, of sectors without nominal 
wage contracts, depends positively on the extent of pass through. 
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Substitution of (12) into either (10) or (11) and the result into (1) 
yields output of a noncontract firm with market-clearing (mc) wages: 
𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑐 = 𝛼𝜆
((𝜂 − 𝛽𝜀)𝛾(𝑠 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑚 − 𝑝)
[𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + 𝜀])
. 
(13) 
Thus, output of firms in sectors without wage contracts 
responds ambiguously to an increased degree of pass through. This 
ambiguity can be understood by considering the direct and indirect 
effects of variations in the extent of pass through. The direct effect of 
a greater extent of pass through occurs via an increase in consumer 
price inflation as a consequence of higher prices of imported goods. 
The indirect effect of an enlarged degree of pass through takes place 
via a change in the real exchange rate, which affects domestic output 
by altering relative prices. In equation (13), a greater extent of pass 
through increases the magnitude of γ and thereby raises the demand 
for domestic output and thus non-contracting firms' demand for labor. 
Hence, the indirect effect of an increased degree of pass through is a 
positive dependence of output on the magnitude of γ operating 
through the η coefficient in the first term of the numerator of the ratio 
within parentheses in (13). At the same time, however, an increase in 
the extent of the direct effect of pass through boosts the level of prices 
of imported foreign goods, which raises the consumer price index, 
induces a decline in labor supply, and thereby tends to reduce 
employment and output in sectors with market-clearing wages. Thus, 
the direct effect results in a contrasting negative dependence on the 
magnitude of γ. This effect operates through the βε coefficient in the 
first term of the numerator of the ratio within parentheses in (13). On 
net, therefore, the impact of a larger degree of pass through on output 
of non-contracting firms is indeterminate. 
For atomistic wage setters within the fraction, Ω, of firms in 
sectors with nominal wage contracts, the contract wage is equal to the 
expected value of the market clearing wage, 𝑤𝑖
𝑐 = ?̂?𝑖
𝑒. Hence, from 
(10) and (1), the output of a firm with wage contracts is 
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𝑦𝑖
𝑐 =
−𝛼𝜀(?̂?𝑖
𝑒 − 𝑝) + 𝜂𝛾(𝑠 − 𝑝) + 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)(𝑚 − 𝑝)
(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀)
. 
(14) 
Because wages are fixed in this sector, pass through affects 
output only through the indirect, real-exchange-rate channel, through 
which output at firms with wage contracts unambiguously responds 
positively to an increased extent of pass through. The demand for 
output of domestic firms depends positively on the real exchange rate; 
that is, in logs, an increase in the differential between the exchange-
rate-adjusted index of prices charged in domestic markets by foreign 
firms and the index of domestic firms' prices pushes up the demand 
for domestic output. Consequently, a greater degree of pass through 
boosts the real exchange rate and raises the derived demand for labor 
by domestic firms. With nominal wages set by contracts, the result is a 
rise in domestic employment and hence domestic output. 
2.5. The sacrifice ratio: comparative statics and 
ambiguous price versus exchange-rate effects 
Most theoretical analyses focus on a nation's sacrifice ratio 
expressed in terms of a direct relationship between its output and 
price level. Sacrifice ratios examined empirically by Ball (1994) and 
other authors, however, typically are computed using CPI inflation 
rates, which incorporate effects of exchange-rate variations as well as 
changes in the index of prices of domestic firms. Our analysis, 
therefore, considers both the direct responsiveness of the nation's 
domestic output to a change in the domestic price level and the 
indirect output responsiveness to a change in the exchange rate. To 
highlight the different mechanisms of output responses to the price 
level versus the exchange rate, we compute the effects on output of 
changes in each of these variables separately. Firms behave 
identically, so that 𝑦𝑖
𝑐 = 𝑦𝑐 for all i ∈  [0, Ω ] and 𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑐 = 𝑦𝑚𝑐 for all 
i ∈  (Ω, 1]. It follows that y =  Ωyc +  (1 −  Ω)ymc. Substituting from 
(12) and (13) and differentiating with respect to the index of domestic 
firms' price level yields the following expression for the response of 
aggregate domestic output to a change in the domestic price level 
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𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑝
=
𝛺{𝛼[𝜀 − (1 − 𝛽)] − 𝛼𝜂𝛾}
𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀
+
(1 − 𝛺)𝜆𝛼[(𝛽𝜀 − 𝜂)𝛾 − (1 − 𝛽)]
𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + 𝜀
. 
(15) 
Under imperfect competition, there are no firm-level supply 
curves and no aggregate supply relationship. Consequently, the 
expression in (15) is the slope of the relationship between the 
aggregate output of profit-maximizing price-setting firms and the 
overall level of prices set by these firms. If markets are sufficiently 
non-competitive, it is feasible for this slope to be negative, because 
profit-maximizing firms with considerable monopoly power seek to 
restrain output substantially in order to boost prices. Hence, computed 
solely with respect to an increase in the index of domestic firms' 
prices, the domestic sacrifice ratio is positive for a sufficiently large 
value of ε—that is, if the degree of competition is sufficiently high. 
Differentiating (15) with respect to β yields 𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛽 =
(Ω𝛼)/(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + [(1 − Ω)𝛼𝜆(𝜀𝛾 + 1)]/[𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + 𝜀] > 0. Thus, 
as in Daniels and VanHoose (2006), one prediction forthcoming from 
this model is that, with respect to the index of domestic firms' prices, 
an increase in the extent to which the nation's economy is open to 
international trade boosts the sacrifice ratio. This is so because greater 
openness renders desired expenditures on domestic output less 
sensitive to variations in aggregate domestic income, which makes 
each firm's profit-maximizing price less responsive to a change in 
aggregate domestic output. As a consequence, in a more open 
economy, greater variations in output will be observed for given 
variations in the index of prices charged by domestic firms. 
Differentiating (15) with respect to γ yields 𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛾 =
𝛼(((1 − Ω)𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀)𝛽𝜀 − [𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + Ω𝜀]𝜂)/(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀)), the 
sign of which is indeterminate. Note that in this expression, if Ω =  1, 
so that all sectors of the economy utilize nominal wage contracts, 
𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛾𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛾 <  0 follows unambiguously. In this special 
case, a greater extent of pass through makes the index of prices 
charged in domestic markets by foreign firms less sensitive to 
variations in the real exchange rate brought about by changes in 
prices charged by domestic firms, which makes the demand for 
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domestic output less sensitive to variations in the index of domestic 
firms' prices. Thus, a larger degree of pass through reduces the 
sacrifice ratio in an all-contracting economy. This result is comparable 
to Flamini's (2007) finding, in the context of a theoretical framework in 
which nominal rigidities instead arise from price stickiness and impinge 
on multiple exchange-rate channels, that greater pass through reduces 
the responsiveness of the variability of the output gap to the variability 
of inflation. In Flamini's general-equilibrium model, a monetary 
authority's utilization of an inflation-targeting procedure induces 
endogenous responses of agents that yield a net effect of a negative 
influence of increased pass through on the sacrifice ratio. In our 
simpler framework, an analogous outcome arises as well through a 
real-exchange rate effect that exists in the absence of policymaking 
choices by a monetary authority. 
In contrast, if Ω =  0, so that all sectors of the economy have 
market-determined nominal wages, 𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛾𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛾 >  0. In 
an open economy, a greater degree of pass through generates an 
enlarged sensitivity of domestic-market prices to foreign firms' prices 
and thereby causes domestic output to respond more strongly to 
changes in the sacrifice ratio. Thus, in an economy in without nominal 
rigidities, our model yields an outcome contradictory to Flamini's, in 
which greater pass through induces domestic output to adjust more 
flexibly in association with a domestic price-level change, resulting in a 
larger predicted sacrifice-ratio response to domestic price inflation. 
It follows then in an economy made up of both sectors with 
nominal wage contracts and sectors with market-clearing wages 
(that is, 0 <  Ω <  1), the theoretically predicted effect of an increased 
degree of pass through on the sacrifice ratio is ambiguous. Only 
empirical analysis could determine whether the net effect is positive or 
negative. 
In addition, 𝜕((𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛽))/𝜕𝛾 = ((1 − Ω)𝛼𝜆𝜀/[𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) +
𝜀] > 0. A greater extent of pass through further stimulates inflation-
induced production in market-clearing sectors. A rise in γ boosts the 
direct effect operating through the βε coefficient in the output 
expressions for output of market-clearing firms in (13) that was noted 
above, thus enhancing the impact that greater openness has on prices 
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charged by domestic firms and their effects on domestic output. Thus, 
an enlarged degree of pass through enhances the positive effect of a 
greater degree of openness on the sacrifice ratio expressed only in 
terms of domestic prices. 
In an open economy, however, exchange-rate variations 
influence consumer prices and consequently impinge on the sacrifice 
ratio alongside changes in domestic prices. Thus, a full analysis of the 
sacrifice-ratio implications of greater openness must take into account 
the responsiveness of the nation's output to a change in the exchange 
rate. From (13) and (14), differentiating aggregate output with respect 
to the exchange rate yields 
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑠
=
𝛺𝛼𝜂𝛾
𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀
−
(1 − 𝛺)𝜆𝛼(𝛽𝜀 − 𝜂)𝛾
𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + 𝜀
. 
(16) 
This expression is ambiguous in sign but is more likely to be 
negative for a sufficiently large value of ε, because under this condition 
the predominant effect of domestic currency depreciation is to reduce 
the real wage rate and hence reduce labor supply and output. Note 
that the effect of greater openness on the output impact of the 
exchange rate is given by 𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑠)/𝜕𝛽 = ((1 − Ω)𝛼𝜆𝜀𝛾/𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) +
𝜀) < 0. Consequently, in contrast to the positive impact that a greater 
degree of trade openness has on the sacrifice ratio via the domestic 
price channel, increased openness has a negative effect on the 
sacrifice ratio via the real-exchange-rate channel, and this negative 
impact of openness is enlarged with a greater extent of pass-through 
(a higher value of γ). 
Could the negative effect of greater openness generated 
through the domestic real-currency-depreciation channel more than 
offset the positive openness effect operating through an increase in 
the index of prices at domestic firms? Potentially, the answer is yes. If 
exchange-rate overshooting is commonplace, for example, then a rise 
in the nominal exchange rate could exceed an increase in the domestic 
price index. If the degree of overshooting is regularly sufficiently large, 
then the net effect of openness on the sacrifice ratio could be 
negative—if the degree of pass through is also sufficiently large. 
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As in the case of the pass-through influence on the sacrifice 
ratio operating through the direct effect on output of a variation in the 
price level, a change in the degree of pass through exerts an 
ambiguous influence via the indirect, exchange-rate effect. Equation 
(16) indicates that if 𝛺 =  0, so that nominal wage contracts exist in all 
sectors of the nation's economy, 𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑠)/𝜕𝛾𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑠)/𝜕𝛾 <  0, 
whereas if 𝛺 =  1, so that nominal wages throughout the economy are 
market-determined, 𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑠)/𝜕𝛾𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑠)/𝜕𝛾 >  0. These signs are 
reversed relative to the contracted-wage/flexible-wage cases discussed 
above with respect to the direct channel operating from the domestic 
price level to real output. Hence, as is true for the theoretical effects of 
greater openness on the sacrifice ratio, the influences of increased 
pass through on the sacrifice ratio operating through the direct price-
level and indirect exchange-rate channel are exactly opposed, which 
yields ambiguous predictions. 
To summarize, the impacts of both an increased degree of 
openness and a greater extent of exchange-rate pass through on the 
sacrifice ratio operate through opposing direct and indirect channels. 
The direct, domestic-price channel yields a positive impact on the 
sacrifice ratio, and the indirect, real-exchange-rate channel yields a 
negative sacrifice-ratio effect. Of course, on net the overall effects of 
an increased degree of openness and a greater extent of pass through 
operating via both channels simultaneously is ambiguous. 
Furthermore, the overall effect of greater trade openness is 
conditioned on interactions among the degree of openness and other 
key characteristics of the economy, in particular the extent of 
exchange-rate pass through. The theoretical importance of accounting 
for such interactions may help to explain why Daniels et al. (2005) and 
Bowdler (2009)—who fail to consider a role for the extent of pass 
through—reach opposing conclusions on the effects of a greater 
degree of openness on the sacrifice ratio. Thus, our empirical work 
that follows seeks to take into account interactions among all of these 
variables. 
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3. Empirical evidence on pass through, openness, 
and the sacrifice ratio 
The key empirical implications of our theoretical model are as 
follows: 
i)the predicted effect of a greater degree of openness on the sacrifice 
ratio is theoretically ambiguous, depending on whether price-
level or real-exchange-rate channel predominates, and can only 
be determined empirically; 
ii)the predicted impact of a greater extent of exchange-rate pass 
through on the sacrifice ratio is theoretically ambiguous, 
depending on the relative share of the economy with flexible 
versus contracted nominal wages, and can only be determined 
empirically; 
iii)an increased extent of pass through enhances (reduces) a positive 
(negative) effect of openness on the sacrifice ratio. 
3.1. Dependent variable: the sacrifice ratio 
We begin the empirical analysis with the estimates of the 
sacrifice ratio from Bowdler (2009). These estimates cover the period 
1981 through 1998. We extend the data in both directions, estimating 
the sacrifice ratio from 1975 through 2004. These estimates are 
consistent with Bowdler (and hence the procedure of Ball, 1994) and 
are likewise based on data from the International Monetary Fund's 
International Financial Statistics.3 
The independent variable of analysis, the sacrifice ratio, SAC, is 
the ratio of the reduction in trend output to the associated change in 
trend inflation for a given disinflationary period. Trend inflation is 
measured as average inflation over eight quarters, centered on a given 
year, so that trend inflation for year t is the average over the last two 
quarters of year t −  1 through the first two quarters of t +  1. A 
disinflation period is defined as a period in which trend inflation 
declines by more than 1.5 percent from a peak to a trough. The length 
of a disinflationary period is then measured in years and varies from 
observation to observation. These calculations are made for 20 
advanced economies resulting in 69 observations. Table 1 provides 
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summary statistics for all variables and Table 2 provides a correlation 
matrix. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for 20 countries, 1975–2004.a 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observationsb 
SAC 
Overall 1.4933 1.7938 −1.1910 10.5290 N = 69 
Between  1.0983 0.2895 4.8785 n = 20 
Within  1.5011 −1.3359 8.3811 T = 3.45 
Length 
Overall 4.4783 2.0264 1.0000 11.0000 N = 69 
Between  1.3109 2.8000 9.5000 n = 20 
Within  1.7062 1.7283 9.2283 T = 3.45 
Inflation 
Overall 10.5547 6.3224 1.2708 27.5863 N = 69 
Between  4.0753 5.9309 21.7710 n = 20 
Within  4.8358 −2.6974 21.8908 T = 3.45 
ΔInflation 
Overall 6.2683 4.1652 1.5288 17.9950 N = 69 
Between  2.1370 3.2730 11.0450 n = 20 
Within  3.6398 −1.1506 15.2825 T = 3.45 
CBI 
Overall 0.4452 0.1979 0.1505 0.9314 N = 69 
Between  0.2153 0.1505 0.9314 n = 20 
     T = 3.45 
Openness 
Overall 29.4823 12.1045 10.0800 65.6100 N = 69 
Between  12.7211 10.0800 65.6100 n = 20 
     T = 3.45 
Pass Through 
Overall 0.6512 0.2905 0.1000 1.1300 N = 65 
Between  0.2833 0.1000 1.1300 n = 19 
     T = 3.42105 
Concentration 
Overall 0.0628 0.0130 0.0458 0.0968 N = 69 
Between  0.0136 0.0458 0.0968 n = 20 
     T = 3.45 
Propensity 
Overall 102.7854 8.5543 76.9583 112.8125 N = 69 
Between  8.3788 76.9583 112.8125 n = 20 
     T = 3.45 
Union Density 
Overall 44.2573 18.4502 9.99 79.42 N = 69 
Between  18.0195 11.77 77.6775 n = 20 
Within  6.9735 19.3198 65.4197 T = 3.45 
aAustralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. 
bN provides the number of total observations, n the number of cross sections, 
and T the average number of observations per cross section.  
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Table 2. Correlation of explanatory variables. 
 Length Inflation ΔInflation CBI Openness 
Pass 
Through 
Union 
Density 
Length 1       
Inflation 0.0409 1      
ΔInflation 0.4134 0.8091 1     
CBI −0.0534 −0.3168 −0.213 1    
Openness −0.0045 −0.0167 −0.0082 −0.0316 1   
Pass 
Through 
0.1346 −0.0194 0.005 0.0376 −0.2623 1  
Union 
Density 
−0.1190 0.1873 0.0667 −0.2482 0.2904 −0.3086 1 
Correlation coefficients in bold are significant at the 10 percent level. 
As shown in Table 1, the sacrifice ratio ranges from a minimum 
of −1.191 to a maximum of 10.529. The length of each disinflationary 
period, Length, is one of our independent variables, and ranges from a 
minimum of one year to a maximum of 11 years. Not only does the 
length of each disinflationary period vary; so does the number of 
observations per country. As shown in Table 1, the average number of 
observations (T) per country is 3.45, with a minimum of 2 
observations for Germany and Spain to a maximum of 5 observations 
for Australia. Table 1 also provides the overall standard deviation 
(1.794) as well as the between (1.098) and within standard deviation 
(1.501). 
3.2. Independent variables 
Our independent variables of analysis include those shown to be 
important by the existing literature. The initial level of inflation is 
measured at the peak and labeled Inflation in the following data 
tables. The change in inflation from the peak to the trough is labeled 
ΔInflation. The Inflation, ΔInflation, and Length measures vary for 
each disinflationary period and, therefore, vary both across country 
and within country. Ball (1994) shows that faster disinflations or the 
“cold turkey” approach results in a lower loss of output than a 
gradualist approach. Hence, ΔInflation is expected to have a negative 
relationship with SAC, while Length is expected to have a positive 
relationship. Ball's results for the initial level of inflation, Inflation, 
were insignificant. 
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For the reasons spelled out by Daniels et al. (2005), we augment this 
data with their measure of central bank independence, CBI, derived 
from Franzese (2002). As with openness, CBI does not vary over time 
and has no within-cross-section variation. Daniels et al. show that 
greater central bank independence has a positive impact on the 
sacrifice ratio. 
We also include a measure of the degree of trade openness, 
Openness. Romer (1993) is a key contribution to the literature on the 
impact of openness on inflation outcomes. Romer argues that 
equilibrium inflation is lower in more open economies as policymakers 
have less of an incentive to pursue expansionary policies as the 
economy becomes more open. In his empirical analysis he considers 
only the cross-section variation of openness (the average over the 
sample period) to minimize potential endogeneity between openness 
and inflation. Instrumental variable analysis provides no evidence that 
empirical relationship between openness and inflation results from the 
potential endogeneity. As a result of this work, the bulk of the 
literature on the impact of openness on the sacrifice ratio follows 
Romer by measuring the degree of openness as the average of the 
annual ratio of imports to GDP over the entire sample period. This 
measure is taken from the World Development Indicators. 
As explained in the introduction, evidence on the effect of 
openness on the sacrifice ratio is mixed. This effect is likely to depend 
on cross-country structural characteristics, such as CBI and exchange-
rate pass through. Hence, to capture cross-country variation in 
exchange-rate pass through, we include Campa and Goldberg's (2005) 
estimates of the extent of nominal exchange-rate pass through 
elasticity spanning the period 1975 through 2003, Pass Through. We 
use this elasticity measure because, as Campa and Goldberg argue, it 
has a direct economic interpretation and is the most relevant measure 
of the impact of exchange rate changes on inflation performance. Note 
that Campa and Goldberg empirically estimate exchange-rate pass 
through implementing a variation of equation (8) above 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑤𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , 
(17) 
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where wt is a control variable for exporter costs and yt is real income 
of the importing economy.4 Their estimates reflect the impact of a 
one-percent fluctuation of the nominal exchange rate on import prices 
as discussed in the theoretical model presented in the previous 
section. Hence, a pass-through estimate of 0.65 (the mean value in 
our sample of countries) implies that a one percent depreciation of the 
domestic currency would result in a 0.65 percent increase in the 
import price index of the domestic country. 
Campa and Goldberg provide both short-run estimates (the 
coefficient on the one-quarter lag of the nominal exchange rate) and 
long-run estimates (the sum of the four-quarter lags of the nominal 
exchange rate) that result from a regression of import prices on lags of 
the nominal exchange rate and other controls. We use the long-run 
estimates, because they are consistent with our annual estimates of 
trend inflation and the sacrifice ratio. In addition, their pass-through 
estimates represent average pass through for the sample period 
(which corresponds with our period of analysis). It is important to 
point out that Campa and Goldberg consider whether the degree of 
pass through has declined over time. Based on two different stability 
tests, they reject stability of short-run pass through for a subset of 
countries. They are unable to reject stability of long-run pass through, 
however. Hence, we consider only the cross-section variation in long-
run pass through to minimize potential endogeneity between inflation 
and pass through that might arise if inflation influences exporters' 
ability to pass through exchange rate changes. In our empirical work 
below, we test for endogeneity and offer instrument variable (IV) 
regressions as tests of robustness. 
3.3. Empirical model and results 
Because the key variable of analysis, the degree of openness, 
the level of central bank independence, and the extent of pass through 
are all time invariant, a random effects model is employed. Due to the 
number of observations and the nature of the data set, Daniels et al. 
and Bowdler suggest testing for potential outliers. Therefore, we test 
for outliers by specifying a regression equation with the sacrifice ratio 
as the dependent variable and Inflation, ΔInflation, Length, CBI, 
Openness, and a constant as regressors. We use the DFITS statistics 
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as our criterion for the detection of outliers. Following Maddala (2001), 
we control for the influence of outliers using bounded influence 
estimation.5 
The Breusch–Pagen/Cook–Weisberg test is used to test for 
heteroskedasticity. This test rejects the null hypothesis of constant 
variance. Hence, all of the subsequent regression models report robust 
standard errors. Furthermore, following Caporale and Caporale (2008), 
we also control for the clustering of error terms at the country level. 
Regression Model 1 in Table 3 is a base specification that 
includes standard determinants of the sacrifice ratio; Inflation, 
ΔInflation, Length, CBI, and Openness. As in Ball and Bowdler, the 
length of the disinflationary period remains a key determinant of the 
sacrifice ratio. There are important differences regarding effects of 
other variables, however. First, the coefficient estimate for CBI is, 
consistent with Daniels et al. (2005), positive and significant. 
Additionally, Bowdler reports “weak” evidence linking the change in 
inflation to SAC, whereas our results are significant at the 1 percent 
level. More importantly, Bowdler also reports a weak negative 
correlation between Openness and SAC, whereas our results are 
significant at the 5 percent level. These differences are likely an 
outcome of the larger data set (a longer time horizon in both 
directions) that we employ. Recall that the results of the theoretical 
model imply that a negative effect of greater openness on the sacrifice 
ratio results if the indirect, longer-term effect operating through the 
real-exchange-rate channel predominates over the direct, shorter-term 
positive impact operating through the domestic-price channel. These 
results are suggestive of an interpretation that—in the context of the 
more recent data explored here and by Bowdler—the real-exchange-
rate exchange rate channel has become empirically more important 
over time. 
Table 3. Sacrifice ratio estimates for 20 countries, 1975–2004a (robust 
standard errors in second row). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Length 
0.6915*** 0.6587*** 0.6654*** 0.6662*** 0.5989*** 
0.1008 0.091 0.0964 0.0969 0.1215 
Inflation 
0.0409 0.0381 0.0361 0.0361 0.0245 
0.0343 0.0307 0.0346 0.0343 0.1214 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
ΔInflation 
−0.2233*** −0.2134*** −0.2150*** −0.2150*** −0.1444 
0.0663 0.0581 0.0636 0.0632 0.0500 
CBI 
1.4726** 1.4738** 1.4294** 1.3616** 0.7846** 
0.5732 0.5972 0.5196 0.5458 0.4756 
Openness 
−0.0314**  −0.0266*** −0.0266*** −0.0184*** 
0.0125  0.0091 0.0100 0.0067 
Pass Through 
 1.1704* 0.8657** 0.0389* 1.3476* 
 0.5961 0.4031 0.0204 0.5655 
Constant 
5.7812*** 4.1804** 5.4072*** 5.5768*** 5.5768*** 
1.602 1.5421 1.485 1.5242 0.7526 
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 
R-squaredb 0.6768 0.6581 0.6965 0.6916 0.6224 
R-Barb 0.6455 0.625 0.6617 0.6562 0.3941 
F 14.63 13.59 12.72 12.62 6.28 
*Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% 
level, for two-tailed test. 
aAll models control for clustering at the country level. 
bUncentered R2 and centered R2 Model 5. 
Although our main interest is how pass through might condition 
the effect of openness on the sacrifice ratio, Model 2 drops Openness 
and adds Pass Through to the base model to consider a potential 
independent effect. In Model 2, the coefficient estimate for Pass 
Through is positive and statistically significant at the 6 percent level. 
Furthermore, its inclusion has little impact on the sign and significance 
of the other model variables. This result suggests that countries with a 
greater degree of exchange-rate pass through tend to have a larger 
sacrifice ratio, consistent with the effects of variations in the extent of 
pass through operating primarily through the direct, domestic-price 
channel. 
Model 3 includes both Openness and Pass Through. The 
inclusion of both variables lowers the p-value of Openness to 1 percent 
and the p-value of Pass Through to 4.5 percent.6 The estimates of this 
model suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in Openness 
results in a 0.37 decrease in the SAC, whereas a one-standard-
deviation increase in Pass Through results in a 0.27 increase in the 
SAC. These individual effects of Openness and Pass Through on SAC 
are illustrated in added-variable plots in Figs. 1 and 2. Fig. 1 plots the 
residuals of a regression of Openness (as the dependent variable) on 
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all other model variables against the residuals of a regression of SAC 
(as the dependent variable) on all other variables except Openness, 
thereby isolating the impact of Openness on SAC. Fig. 2 provides the 
corresponding plot for Pass Through. 
 
Fig. 1. Individual marginal effect of openness. 
 
Fig. 2. Individual marginal effect of pass through. 
Models 4 and 5 address the potential for endogeneity between 
exchange rate pass through and inflation. Model 4 takes a very simple 
approach and uses the rank order of the pass through estimates 
across the countries in the sample as an instrument. The results differ 
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only slightly from Model 3 in that the p-value for Pass Through (using 
the rank) rises to 0.072. 
Model 5 is motivated by the fact, discussed in section 2, that the 
composition of a nation's import bundle may be an important factor in 
explaining exchange-rate pass through into import prices, especially 
the rise in the share of manufactured goods in the import basket. 
Following this argument, we use two different measures of the 
structure of a nation's trade to instrument for exchange-rate pass 
through. The first measure is the value of a concentration index of 
merchandise imports centered on the year 1995. The measure is a 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index of the degree of market concentration 
normalized to value ranging from zero to one, with one indicating 
maximum concentration. The concentration variable and a description 
of its construction is available through UNCTAD STAT. It is assumed 
that increased market concentration reflects a greater share of 
manufactured goods within merchandise imports, which, according to 
Campa and Goldberg, results in reduced pass through. 
The second measure of trade structure is the average value for 
the country's import propensity score for manufactured goods, 
available from the Structural Analysis Database (STAN) of the OECD. 
This measure shows the country's imports for manufactured goods, 
relative to its total imports, divided by manufactured goods imports of 
the 23 OECD countries relative to the 23 OECD countries' total 
imports. It is benchmarked at 100 so that values above 100 indicate 
that the country tends to have a “high propensity,” relative to the 
OECD, to import manufactured goods. A higher propensity to import 
manufactured goods is assumed to result in reduced pass through. 
Although both variables show a positive correlation with Openness, 
they also display a negative correlation (and with a greater correlation 
coefficient) with Pass Through.7 
Table 3 provides the results of Model 5's Two-Stage-GMM IV 
regression using the concentration index and propensity score as 
instruments for pass through. The results show only a slight change, 
with the significance level for ΔInflation rising slightly above 10 
percent (p = 0.106). Using this model, we first test the potential 
endogeneity of the pass through variable. Based on the C statistic 
(difference-in-Sargan statistic), we are unable to reject the null 
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hypothesis that Pass Through is exogenous. Continuing with the 
diagnostics of the IV regression, the Angrist–Pischke multivariate F 
test of excluded regressors indicates that the two instruments are 
jointly significant at the 1 percent level in the first-stage regression, 
and the Kleibergen–Paap LM statistic rejects under-identification of the 
first-stage regression. The Cragg–Donald Wald F statistic for the 
Weak-Identification test is 17.64, falling between the 10 percent and 
15 percent Stock-Yogo critical values. These results fail to provide 
evidence that potential endogeneity is likely to be the source of the 
positive and significant result for Pass Through on the sacrifice ratio. 
We next consider the interactions of Openness, CBI, and Pass Through 
using the original Pass Through variable. Model 6 of Table 4 includes 
an interaction term between Pass Through and Openness. Our theory 
suggests that a greater extent of exchange-rate pass through 
enhances an output expansion generated by a higher price level in 
nominal-wage-contracting sectors, boosting the positive impact of a 
greater degree of openness on the sacrifice ratio via the direct 
channel.8 Consistent with this theoretical prediction, the estimated 
coefficient on this interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant. Note that the estimated total marginal effect of Openness 
on the sacrifice ratio in Model 6 is the sum of the coefficient on 
Openness plus the coefficient on the Openness-Pass Through 
interaction term, PT·Openness, times a given value for Pass Through. 
Evaluated at the mean value for Pass Through, the total estimated 
marginal effect of Openness on the sacrifice ratio remains negative 
and statistically significant. Fig. 3 illustrates the total marginal effect of 
Openness on SAC, taking into account the interaction with Pass 
Through. Fig. 3 also includes the point estimates for each individual 
country given in light of each nation's unique measure of Pass Through 
(plotted on the right-hand axis), along with a histogram of the Pass 
Through measures (plotted on the left-hand axis). For reference 
purposes, the individual marginal effect of Openness on SAC is 
illustrated by the solid horizontal line. 
Table 4. Sacrifice ratio estimates for 20 countries, 1975–2004a (robust 
standard errors in second row). 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Length 
0.6599*** 0.6633*** 0.6643*** 0.6694*** 0.6712*** 
0.1063 0.0971 0.0969 0.0996 0.0959 
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 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Inflation 
0.0267 0.0295 0.0305 0.0263 0.0147 
0.0375 0.0349 0.0360 0.0356 0.0391 
ΔInflation 
−0.2027** −0.2074*** −0.2087*** −0.2060*** −0.1940** 
0.0720 −0.0645 0.0651 0.0648 0.0693 
CBI 
1.3965** 3.6094** 2.8324*** 1.6341*** 1.3285** 
0.5455 1.5627 0.6522 0.4667 0.4733 
Openness 
−0.0582*** 0.0094 −0.0267** −0.0301*** −0.0297*** 
0.0119 0.0276 0.0094 0.0085 0.0071 
Pass Through 
−0.9089 0.9090** 1.7919*** 1.0244** −1.2289 
0.5604 0.4241 0.4510 0.3836 0.7983 
Union Density 
   0.0118** −0.0236* 
   0.0053 0.0182 
PT·Openness 
0.0538***     
0.0164     
CBI·Openness 
 −0.0758    
 0.0548    
CBI·PT 
  −2.1474**   
  0.8515   
PT·Union Dens. 
    0.0522*** 
    0.0182 
Constant 
6.7422*** 4.4495*** 4.8563*** 4.8108*** 6.6061*** 
1.7476 1.4111 1.4206 1.3297 1.4772 
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 
R-squared 0.7164 0.7004 0.7013 0.7073 0.7237 
R-Bar 0.6786 0.6605 0.6615 0.6683 0.6816 
F 16.93 11.39 12.23 15.32 23.01 
*Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% 
level, for two-tailed test. 
aAll models control for clustering at the country level. 
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Fig. 3. Estimated total marginal effect of openness on SAC. 
Model 7 drops the interaction of Pass Through and Openness 
and controls for a potential interplay between CBI and Openness, as 
suggested by Daniels et al. Once this interaction is taken into account, 
the coefficient estimate for Openness is no longer statistically 
significant. This finding is consistent with the theoretical model 
presented in Section 2 and with the more recent results of Bowdler.9 
Models 6 and 7 suggest that the overall impact of openness on the 
sacrifice ratio depends on interacting structural parameters of the 
macroeconomy. Once the full scope of these interactions is taken into 
account, the impact of Openness on the sacrifice ratio is not 
statistically robust. 
Model 8 explores a potential interaction between CBI and Pass 
Through by including this interaction and dropping the pass-through-
openness interaction. Daniels et al. (2005) suggest that greater CBI 
leads to greater nominal wage contracting and a larger sacrifice ratio. 
Greater CBI and greater nominal wage contracting would also leave 
less scope for exchange-rate pass through to independently exert a 
positive influence on the sacrifice ratio. This conclusion suggests a 
negative coefficient estimate for the CBI-Pass Through interaction 
term. The estimate of the interaction term is indeed negative and 
statistically significant, providing some empirical support for this 
argument. 
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In addition to the empirical models summarized in Tables 3 and 
4, we also examined how the extent of wage contracting within the 
economy conditions the effect of exchange-rate pass through on the 
sacrifice ratio. This is motivated by both the theoretical model of 
Section 2 and the recent work of Nickell et al. (2005) and Bowdler and 
Nunziata (2010). In a study of unemployment in OECD countries, 
Nickell et al. find that changes in several labor market institutions 
(benefits, trade union density, wage coordination, employment 
protection laws, and labor taxes) explain approximately 55 percent of 
the rise in unemployment that occurred in Europe over a thirty-five 
year period. Bowdler and Nunziata consider how labor market 
characteristics affect the sacrifice ratio and conclude that a negative 
relationship exists between wage coordination and sacrifice ratios of 
OECD countries. 
In the theoretical model presented in Section 2.5, exchange-
rate pass through exerts an ambiguous influence on the sacrifice ratio, 
depending on the extent of wage contracting in the economy, 
represented by the parameter Ω in the theoretical model, and on the 
opposing effects of pass through operating through the direct 
domestic-price and the indirect exchange-rate channels. The 
comparative statics of the model for the all-contracting economy imply 
that an enlarged degree of pass through operating through the direct 
domestic-price channel results in a larger sacrifice ratio, while 
operating through the indirect exchange-rate channel it results in a 
lower sacrifice ratio. Opposite conclusions hold for the economy 
without nominal rigidities. 
Daniels et al. (2006, page 984) contend that union density is 
the best proxy measure of the share of firms with nominal wage 
contracts. Hence, Model 9 of Table 4 includes Union Density (from 
Visser, 2009), which covers our full sample and, as shown in Table 1, 
varies over country and time. Consistent with Bowdler and Nunziata 
(Table 3, Model 4), the relationship between Union Density and the 
sacrifice ratio is positive, indicating that the sacrifice ratio is increased 
in economies with greater wage contracting; however, in contrast to 
Bowdler and Nunziata, it is also significant at the 5 percent level in our 
model. Model fit improves with the inclusion of this variable and Pass 
Through remains positive and significant. 
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Model 10 of Table 4 adds the interaction of Pass Through and 
Union Density. This model suffers from multicollinearity, so the 
significance level for the individual effects of Pass Through and Union 
Density fall just outside of the 10 percent and 5 percent level 
respectively while the two individual effects along with their interaction 
term are jointly significant (with a p-value of less than 1 percent). 10 
Evaluated at the mean value for Union Density, the total effect of Pass 
Through is positive, statistically significant, and increasing with greater 
Union Density, as predicted by the model if pass through operating 
through the indirect exchange-rate channel more than offsets the 
effect operating through the direct domestic-price channel. These 
results suggest that further study of the importance of the degree of 
nominal wage rigidity as a conditioning factor may be a potentially 
useful path for future research. 
We also consider a model that omits potential outliers. We 
assume a standard threshold for the DFITS statistic of 2 times the 
square root of the number of independent variables (k) divided by the 
number of observations (n), 2·(k/n). Based on this threshold, we 
identify two outliers, Finland (1989–1996, also identified as an outlier 
by Bowdler), and Italy (1977–1978, which was not included in 
Bowdler's sample). For these two observations, Finland had an 
exceptionally large sacrifice ratio (10.529, which is more than two 
standard deviations greater than the mean), and Italy exhibited a very 
large drop in inflation of 13.57 percent over only a one-year 
disinflationary period. The results provided in Table 5 indicate that 
standard measures of model fit were lower under this approach and 
that there were no noteworthy differences in the signs and significance 
levels for the variables of interest. 
Table 5. Sacrifice ratio estimates for 20 countries, 1975–2004.a Omitted 
Outliers Estimation (robust standard errors in second row). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Length 
0.6286*** 0.6233*** 0.6177*** 0.6089*** 0.6177*** 0.6177*** 
0.1228 0.1282 0.1223 0.1259 0.1240 0.1222 
Inflation 
0.0626 0.0659 0.0611 0.0548 0.0610 0.0572 
0.0510 0.0531 0.0519 0.0544 0.0538 0.0538 
ΔInflation 
−0.1948* −0.1995* −0.1921* −0.1813 −0.1920* −0.1878* 
0.1003 0.1016 0.1011 0.1059 0.1039 0.1025 
CBI 1.0491* 1.0748* 1.0233* 0.9942* 1.0761 2.1175*** 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
0.5391 0.5257 0.4932 0.5273 1.4167 0.2943 
Openness 
−0.0205***  −0.1760*** −0.0322*** −0.0167 −0.0176*** 
0.0059  0.005 0.0074 0.0242 0.0051 
Pass Through 
 0.6988** 0.4849** −0.3380 0.4859** 1.2070*** 
 0.3015 0.2299 0.4514 0.2301 0.3212 
PT·Openness 
   0.0247**   
   −0.0099   
CBI·Openness 
    −1.1435  
    0.8151  
CBI·PT 
     −1.6749** 
     −0.5894 
Constant 
−0.7854 −1.8568*** −1.1178* −0.5502  −1.5738*** 
0.6074 0.6118 0.6110 0.7768 −1.1436 0.4577 
    0.8151  
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 
R-squared 0.4698 0.4530 0.4797 0.4863 0.4797 0.4843 
R-Bar 0.4254 0.4082 0.4180 0.4254 0.4709 0.4231 
F 21.34 13.52 15.37 28.81 17.75 33.71 
*Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** 
significant at 1% level, for two-tailed test. 
aAll models control for clustering at the country level and omit 
Finland (1989–1996) and Italy (1977–1978) as outliers.  
The introduction of the euro is an important structural element 
that may influence the effects of CBI, openness, and pass through on 
the sacrifice ratio as well as their interactions. There were two euro-
member nations that experienced a disinflation episode after the 
introduction of the euro: Ireland in 2001 and Portugal in 2001. 
Dropping these two observations from Model 3 had no substantive 
effect on our results. Country size may also be an element that plays 
an important role in our results. To consider this possibility, we 
included in Model 3 a dummy variable that assumes a value of unity 
for those nations for which 2004 real GDP (measured in U.S. dollars 
and from the OECD Main economic Indicators) was below the median 
value for the group included in our analysis. This variable was not 
statistically significant; its only important effect on the results was to 
reduce the p-value of the estimated coefficients on Openness and Pass 
Through. 
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Finally, Bowdler suggests the impact of the degree of openness 
and its interaction with the level of central bank independence may 
have changed along with monetary policymaking after 1980. We also 
introduced a single dummy variable to evaluate the effect of our 
inclusion of the earlier sample period, coding years 1975 through 1980 
as one and all subsequent years as zero. The coefficient estimate for 
this variable was statistically insignificant, and its presence had no 
implication (other than to reduce the p-value on both Openness and 
Pass Through) for our general conclusions. 
4. Conclusion 
Considerable recent work has reached mixed conclusions about 
whether and how globalization affects the output–inflation relationship. 
In this paper, we have explored the implications of a simple theoretical 
model allowing for the variations in extent of exchange-rate pass 
through and the degree of trade openness to exert simultaneous 
effects on the output–inflation trade-off. This model predicts that both 
factors should have interacting effects on the sacrifice ratio. 
Examination of the interaction among measures of the degree of 
openness, the extent of pass through, the level of central bank 
independence, the extent of wage contracting, and other factors 
influencing the sacrifice ratio in cross-country data verifies the 
empirical importance of the predicted interactions. On net, our results 
indicate that a greater extent of pass through increases the sacrifice 
ratio. Furthermore, once the extent of pass through is taken into 
account alongside other factors that affect the sacrifice ratio, the 
degree of openness to international trade tends to have an empirically 
indeterminate effect on the sacrifice ratio. 
Thus, our results suggest that considerable work must be done 
to better understand whether and how greater openness influences the 
output–inflation relationship. In light of the numerous structural 
elements that can impinge on the potential relationship between the 
degree of openness and the sacrifice ratio, it may be appropriate for 
future studies of this relationship to focus attention on evidence 
revealed from time-series data from individual countries instead of 
cross-country data. 
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